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Abstract  This  paper  discusses  how  contingent  convertible  bonds  (CCB)  inﬂuence  the  risk-
taking behaviour  of  managers.  A  methodology  to  measure  the  impact  is  presented.  The  results
show that  the  decision  of  issuing  CCB  to  ﬁnance  company  assets  sets  incentives  to  managers  to
increase risk,  if  it  is  not  adjusted  to  the  compensation  system.  However,  if  the  remuneration  of
managers is  adjusted  simultaneously  with  the  issuance,  e.g.  with  internal  debt,  the  drawbacks
of the  sole  compensation  with  stock  options  can  be  equalised.  Furthermore,  it  was  found  that
CCB does  have  an  impact  on  the  risk-taking  behaviour,  while  CCB  does  not  change  the  incentive
to increase  the  company  value  at  all.
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reserved.
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Resumen  Se  analiza  cómo  los  bonos  convertibles  contingentes  (CCB)  inﬂuyen  las  conductas
deriesgo de  los  directivos.  Se  presenta  una  metodología  para  medir  el  impacto.  Los  resultados
muestran  que  la  decisión  de  emitir  los  CCB  para  ﬁnanciar  la  empresa  incentiva  alos  directivos
a conductas  más  arriesgadas,  si  no  se  ajusta  el  sistema  de  compensación.  Sin  embargo,  si
la remuneracíon  de  los  directivos  se  ajusta  simultáneamente  con  laemisión,  p.ej.  con  deuda
interna, los  inconvenientes  de  una  única  compensación  con  opciones  se  compensarían.  Además,
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hemos  encontrado  que  los  CCB  no  cambian  losincentivos  para  aumentar  el  valor  de  la  empresa
en general.
© 2014  Asociación  Cuadernos  de  Economía.  Publicado  por  Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  Todos  los
derechos reservados.
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ﬁ1. Introduction
In  the  aftermath  of  the  ﬁnancial  crisis  of  2008  the  remuner-
ation  of  managers  of  ﬁnancial  institutions  became  a  widely
discussed  topic.  In  November  2013,  the  Swiss  voted  against
a  ceiling  of  manager  compensation  and  the  European  Union
is  still  undecided  on  whether  or  not  it  should  cap  vari-
able  bonus  payments  to  the  double  of  mangers’  ﬁxed  salary.
Bonuses  and  other  compensation  features  are  used  by  share-
holders  to  control  the  management.  Since  shareholders  seek
higher  proﬁt  and  force  risk  to  increase,  shareholders  try  to
transfer  this  preference  onto  the  managers.  Recent  innova-
tions  of  ﬁnancial  instruments,  such  as  contingent  convertible
bonds,  can  decrease  the  attractiveness  of  risk  for  sharehol-
ders.
Contingent  convertible  bonds  (CCB),  also  known  as  CoCo-
Bonds  or  CoCos,  are  subordinated  bonds  conditional  on  a
certain  event.  In  case  the  event  happens,  CCB  instantly  con-
vert  to  equity  or  are  written-down.  An  example  of  a  trigger
event  could  be  the  equity-ratio  of  a  bank  falling  below  a
certain  threshold  (Flannery,  2005,  2010).  CCB  are  designed
to  strengthen  the  ﬁnancial  stability  of  banks  and  may  imply
that  in  times  of  a  ﬁnancial  crisis  governments  do  not  have  to
bailout  banks  because  the  conversion  lowers  the  pressure  of
leverage  (Flannery,  2010).  Although  there  are  a  lot  of  similar
ﬁnancial  instruments,1 this  paper  puts  its  focus  on  CCB.
Since  the  ﬁrst  issuance  of  CCB  by  the  British  bank  Lloyds
in  2009,  many  other  banks  are  willing  to  use  this  new  instru-
ment  to  back  their  equity-ratio.2 In  times  of  historically  low
interest  rates,  buyers  are  attracted  by  CCB’s  high  yield.  The
Spanish  Banco  Santander  joined  the  group  of  CCB  issuer  con-
sisting  of  BBVA,  Bankia,  Banco  Popular,  and  other  European
banks  in  May  2014.  If  Banco  Santander’s  TIER-1  capital  ratio
falls  below  5.125%  (trigger  point)  bondholders  are  paid  in
equity.
Due  to  the  issuance  of  new  ﬁnancial  instruments,  moral
hazard  is  more  likely  to  arise.  In  this  context  ‘‘moral  haz-
ard’’  means  the  exploitation  of  unobservable  actions  in  an
agency  situation  (Arrow,  1974;  Fama,  1980).  Generally,  in
ﬁrms  or  in  banks  particulary,  one  form  of  moral  hazard  is
the  asset-substitution  or  risk-shifting  problem  (Jensen  and
Meckling,  1976).  As  a  matter  of  fact,  a  shareholder  has
limited  liabilities  and  is  consequently  able  to  increase  own
wealth  by  shifting  from  lower  risk  to  higher  risk  assets.
In  other  words  shareholders’  gains  (agent)  are  the  losses
1 While Dufﬁe (2010) proposes a forced issue of shares on a trigger
event, Kashyap et al. (2008) suggest a capital insurance, where an
insurance company pays a certain amount in case a threshold is
broken.
2 See Berg and Kaserer (2014) for an overview until 2013.
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Mf  bondholders  (principle).  In  an  extreme  scenario  this
ould  lead  to  acceptance  of  negative  net  present  value
rojects,  justiﬁed  by  higher  volatility  (Jensen  and  Meckling,
976;  Gavish  and  Kalay,  1983).  Once  CCB  are  issued,  the
reference  of  shareholders  becomes  less  riskier  or  more
iskier  depending  on  the  conversion  rate  and  the  trigger
vent.  If  shareholders  are  better  situated  after  conver-
ion,  CCB  provide  an  additional  capital  buffer  and  hence
n  extra  appeal  for  risk.  On  the  contrary,  if  CCB  holders
re  equally  or  even  better  situated  after  conversion,  the
isk  preference  of  the  shareholders  shifts  to  a  more  prudent
ne  (Maes  and  Schoutens,  2012;  Berg  and  Kaserer,  2014).
esides  the  conversion  rate,  the  trigger  position  can  inﬂu-
nce  the  risk-taking  incentive  as  well  (Koziol  and  Lawrenz,
012).  Thus,  the  CCB  parameters  (i.e.  trigger  point  and
onversion  rate)  must  be  aligned  properly  to  decrease  the
sset-substitution  problem,  but  still  with  respect  to  other
oral  hazard  problems.3
Until  now,  research  has  concentrated  on  the  impact  of
CB  on  the  incentives  of  risk-taking  for  shareholders.  So
ar,  researchers  have  not  elucidated  which  implications  the
ssuance  of  such  instruments  might  have  on  the  management
f  ﬁrms.  Therefore,  we  attempt  to  illuminate  the  impact  of
CB  on  the  risk-taking  behaviour  of  managers.  To  our  knowl-
dge,  this  paper  is  the  ﬁrst  to  provide  a  model  to  encounter
nﬂuence  of  CCB  on  management.
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows:  the  second  section
rovides  a  literature  review  on  the  topic;  Section  3  explains
he  theoretical  model,  while  Section  4  presents  the  results
nd  Section  5  concludes.
.  Literature review
n  literature  covering  these  problems  on  the  side  of  the
hareholders  is  called  owner-manager,  caused  by  the  pre-
umed  alignment  between  management  and  shareholders.
hareholders  want  their  agents  to  control  the  ﬁrm  on  their
nterest,  therefore  shareholders  set  incentives  for  the  man-
gement  in  form  of  compensation.  Jensen  and  Murphy
1990)  suggest  three  points  to  get  managers  to  maximise
he  ﬁrm  value:  (1)  managers  should  buy  shares  of  the
rm;  (2)  salaries,  bonuses,  and  stock  options  should  be
tructured  such  to  encourage  better  performance;  and  (3)
oor  performance  should  be  punished.  Since  a  large  pro-
ortion  of  remuneration  is  equity-based,  we  conjecture
hat  managers  preferably  seek  to  increase  the  share  value
nstead  of  the  ﬁrm  value.  It  can  be  shown  that  options  and
tock  options  increase  in  value  as  well  when  one  increases
3 For instance the debt-overhang problem (Myers, 1977, 1984;
yers and Majluf, 1984).
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substitution  problem  will  arise.9 Therefore,  Gordon  (2010)6  
olatility.  Henceforth,  managers  will  seek  a  level  of  risk
i.e.  assets’  volatility)  which  serves  them  most  (Hilscher
nd  Raviv,  2014).  In  addition,  stock  options  lead  to  another
oral  hazard  between  shareholders  and  managers.  Because
f  stock  options,  manager  may  even  exacerbate  the  risk
reference  of  the  owners  (Bebchuk  and  Fried,  2003;  Bebchuk
nd  Spamann,  2010).
The  consequences  of  the  risk-taking  incentive  of  equity-
ased  compensation  were  explored  quite  profoundly.
ypically,  researchers  observe  compensation  portfolio’s  sen-
itivity  to  the  underlying  ﬁrm  stock  (Delta)  and  to  ﬁrms’
olatility  (Vega)  to  derive  results.4 John  and  John  (1993)
ound  that  a  reduced  Delta  leads  to  lower  agency  costs  of
ebt.  Houston  and  James  (1995)  report  no  evidence  of  the
isk-taking  incentive  of  managers  compensation.  This  is  sup-
orted  by  the  results  of  Fahlenbrach  and  Stulz  (2011)  who
nd  no  signiﬁcant  importance  of  the  Vega  during  2007--2009
including  the  ﬁnancial  crisis  in  2008)  in  their  sample.  Fur-
hermore,  Chen  and  Ma  (2011)  conclude  that  a  greater
art  of  stock  options  in  managers’  compensation  portfolio
eads  to  lower  risk-taking.  Other  studies,  in  particular  Guay
1999),  Rajgopal  and  Shevlin  (2002)  and  Hanlon  et  al.  (2004),
nd  a  positive  relation  between  granted  stock  options  and
rm’s  risk.5 Cohen  et  al.  (2000)  indicate  that  managers  shift
isk  to  a  higher  extend  in  case  of  a  high  Vega  compensa-
ion.  Furthermore,  the  authors  assume  managers  to  control
he  risk  by  ﬁrm’s  leverage.  Coles  et  al.  (2006)  agree  and
onclude  risk  is  controlled  by  ‘‘more  investments  in  R&D,
ess  investments  in  property,  plant,  and  equipment,  [.  . .]
nd  higher  leverage’’.  The  observation  of  Chen  et  al.  (2006)
nd  DeYoung  et  al.  (2013)  also  shows  that  stock  options  lead
o  more  risk-taking.6 Both  papers  distinguish  between  total,
ystematic,  and  idiosyncratic  risk.  Armstrong  and  Vashishtha
2012)  ﬁnd  managers  with  a  high  Vega  compensation  are
ore  likely  to  increase  only  systematic  risk  than  idiosyn-
ratic  risk,  which  is  favoured  by  shareholders.
While  the  impact  of  equity-based  pay,  such  as  stock
ption  plans,  on  the  risk-taking  incentive  is  quite  well
nown,  little  attention  has  been  paid  on  debt-based  remu-
eration  instruments,  so  called  ‘‘inside  debt’’.  Jensen  and
eckling  (1976)  already  mentioned  inside  debt  could  rem-
dy  some,  if  not  all,  agency  cost  of  debt,  because  managers
ould  no  longer  take  action  at  an  expense  of  debt  hold-
rs.  Other  authors  suggest  inside  debt  to  be  a  part  of  the
ompensation  portfolio  of  managers  alongside  with  stock
ptions  and  other  equity-based  instruments  (Bebchuk  and
pamann,  2010;  Krawcheck,  2012).  While  some  researchers
upport  an  equally-weighted  portfolio,  others  favour  a
arger  part  of  equity-based  payment  for  its  better  incen-
ive  scheme  in  absence  of  ﬁnancial  distress  (e.g.  Jensen
nd  Meckling,  1976;  Edmans  and  Liu,  2010).  Furthermore,
4 Delta and Vega are part of the so called option Greeks, which
epresent ﬁrst and higher order partial derivatives of the option
rice with respect to one or more parameters of the option price.
5 The subject of the aforementioned was not the risk-taking incen-
ive of the manager, but the lowering of the agency cost of equity
ue to the assumed risk aversion of managers without equity-based
ompensation.
6 Both concentrate research on the banking sector and ﬁnd stock
ption plans are more common in banks than other industries.
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anagers  paid  with  inside  debt  would  pay  more  atten-
ion  on  the  ﬁrm  value  in  times  of  ﬁnancial  distress.  While
quity-based  pay  only  happens  if  the  ﬁrm  is  solvent,  inside
ebt  pay-out  is  also  contingent  of  the  ﬁrm  value  in  case
f  bankruptcy  (Edmans  and  Liu,  2010).7 Actually,  inside
ebt  is  very  common.  Pensions  and  deferred  compensation
ave  properties  of  debt  because  both  are  liabilities  of  the
rm  towards  their  managers  and  contingent  to  bankruptcy
Sundaram  and  Yermack,  2007;  Bolton  et  al.,  2011).  Depend-
ng  on  the  special  properties  of  the  pension  plans,  e.g.  if
ensions  are  senior  to  bonds,  pensions  may  not  be  counted
s  debt  and  even  lead  to  an  inverse  incentive  scheme
Anantharaman  et  al.,  2013).  Nevertheless,  all  existing  pub-
ications  on  the  impact  of  inside  debt  on  risk-taking  used
ensions  or  deferred  compensation  as  a  proxy  for  inside
ebt.  It  is  concluded  consistently  that  payment  with  inside
ebt  reduces  risk-taking  incentive  of  managers  (Sundaram
nd  Yermack,  2007;  Wei  and  Yermack,  2011;  Cassell  et  al.,
012;  Cen,  2012).  Other  empirical  research  observe  market’s
eaction  on  announcements  of  inside  debt  pay  of  managers.
t  is  shown  that  ﬁrms  which  pay  managers  with  inside  debt
ave  a  lower  credit  default  swap  spread  and  therefore  are
ssumed  to  be  less  risky  (Bolton  et  al.,  2011;  Wei  and
ermack,  2011).8 Tung  and  Wang  (2012)  investigate  bankers’
ompensation  during  the  ﬁnancial  crisis  and  ﬁnd  that  debt-
ased  remuneration  is  negative  correlated  to  risk-taking.
After  the  global  ﬁnancial  crisis  in  2008,  a high-level
xpert  group  of  the  EU  concluded  that  banks’  managers
hould  be  compensated  not  only  with  equity-based  instru-
ents,  but  also  in  parts  of  bail-in  bonds,  e.g.  CCB  (Liikanen
t  al.,  2012).  In  2011,  the  British  bank  Barclays  initiated  a
ontingent  capital  plan  as  part  of  the  compensation  of  their
oard’s  members.  A  deferred  cash  bonus  is  partly  released
n  speciﬁc  dates  as  long  as  the  TIER-1  capital  ratio  is  equal
o  or  exceeds  7%.  The  Swiss  UBS  also  pays  their  executives
ith  CCB  contingent  on  an  equity  ratio  above  10%  and  a  pos-
tive  after-tax  proﬁt.  As  these  examples  show  the  payment
ith  CCB  is  already  reality.  The  previously  rewarded  CCB
ompensation  does  not  convert  into  equity,  but  cut  off  all
r  parts  of  the  cash  bonuses.  If  managers  are  paid  in  bonds,
hey  would  act  more  likely  on  the  behalf  of  debt  holders  in
imes  of  a stable  ﬁnancial  situation.  After  conversion,  i.e.
n  a  situation  of  ﬁnancial  distress,  managers  now  paid  with
hares  instead  of  bonds  would  act  on  the  behalf  of  the  share-
olders  in  times  when  it  is  needed  the  most  (Kaal,  2012a).
ut  this  should  be  observed  with  caution.  If  managers  are
o  longer  representing  debt  holders’  interests,  the  asset-roposes  a  kind  of  reverted  CCB  as  a  remuneration  instru-
ent.  Its  holders  enjoy  the  advantages  of  shares.  In  case  of
7 This is quite questionable, because managers who may  lead the
rm into bankruptcy would even get paid for that.
8 Gerakos (2010) ﬁnds that either pension commitments are used
o remedy the asset-substitution problem or CEOs are more likely
o accept contracts with ﬁrms of good solvency. Therefore, it is not
lear, if inside debt leads to low credit default swap spreads or if
anagers accept inside debt because of the low spreads.
9 Therefore the cut-off of the cash bonuses after triggering can be
een as a digital option, which has a ﬁxed pay-out if the underlying
rice is above the strike price.
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ﬁnancial  distress  shares  convert  into  debt  and  this  leads  to
managers  to  act  more  conservatively  after  conversion.
While  compensation  with  CCB  is  relevant,  properties
of  CCB  need  to  be  examined  in  detail  such  that  CCB  set
the  desired  incentives  to  managers.  As  for  CCB  as  ﬁnan-
cial  instruments,  CCB  as  payment  for  managers  have  two
main  design  parameters:  the  trigger  and  the  conversion  rate.
Toshniwal  (2011)  and  Kaal  (2012a)  note  that  if  manager  have
substantial  inﬂuence  on  the  design  of  the  inside  CCB,  then
there  is  a  potential  moral  hazard,  depending  on  the  given
compensation  structure  of  the  managers.
3. Model
For  determination  of  the  impact  of  CCB  on  the  risk-taking
incentives  of  managers,  we  adopt  a  Merton  (1974)  like  the-
oretical  structural  model.10 This  model  makes  the  following
assumptions:
•  perfect  capital  market  is  supposed,
•  the  asset  or  ﬁrm  value  (Vt)  at  time  t  follows  a  geometric
Brownian  motion  with  drift,  managers  can  inﬂuence  ﬁrm’s
volatility  ()  over  the  selection  of  projects  or  the  leverage
of  the  ﬁrm  (Cohen  et  al.,  2000),
• the  ﬁrm  value  V  is  ﬁnanced  by  equity  (E),  debt  (D)  and
CCB  (C),
•  debt  and  CCB  are  zero  bonds  and  mature  at  time  T,  and
•  the  risk  free  rate  (r)  is  given.
At  the  time-to-maturity  the  ﬁrm  can  pay  out  the  share-
holders  only  if  Vt is  greater  than  the  sum  of  the  notionals
of  debt  (ND)  and  CCB  (NC),  where  debt  is  senior  to  CCB.
If  positive,  the  difference  between  ﬁrm  value  and  debt  is
left  for  shareholders,  for  which  reason  the  equity  can  be
interpreted  as  a  call  option  on  the  ﬁrms  assets.  Because
CCB  are  conditional  on  a  trigger,  they  convert  at  time  T  to
equity,  if  VT lies  below  a  certain  threshold  P.  Eq.  (1)  sets  the
pay-out  for  shareholders  at  time-to-maturity  (ET)  depending
whether  CCB  convert  or  not.
ET =
{
max(0,  VT −  ND −  NC)  VT≥P
max(0,  VT −  ND) VT <  P
(1)
Fig.  1  shows  an  example  of  an  equity  pay-out  proﬁle.
In  this  example,  V0,  ND,  NC,  and  P.  Hence,  P  represents  a
threshold  or  trigger  point  of  5%  capital  ratio.  In  case  CCB
are  are  normal  debt,  it  can  be  seen  that  equity  pay-out  is
zero  if  the  ﬁrm  value  is  less  than  the  sum  of  all  debt.  In
case  of  the  existence  of  CCB  in  the  capital  structure  (black
dotted  line),  the  pay-out  to  shareholders  is  prolonged,  due
to  the  conversion  of  the  CCB.11
As  the  pay-out  structure  of  equity  (Eq.  (1))  behaves  like  a
call  option  on  the  ﬁrm’s  assets  and  under  the  given  assump-
tions,  the  value  of  equity  can  be  calculated  as  a  combination
of  a  standard  call  and  a  binary  option,  representing  the
10 Some of the further modiﬁcation are motivated by a former
version of Berg and Kaserer (2014) (August 2012).
11 Berg and Kaserer (2014) call this type of CCB ‘‘Convert-to-
Steal’’.
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Figure  1  Equity  pay-out  proﬁle  example.
nﬂuence  of  the  CCB.  Hence,  it  is  explicitly  given  by
0 =  V0 ·  ˚(dV01 (ND))  −  ND · e−rT ·  ˚(dV02 (ND))
−  NC ·  e−rT ·  ˚(dV02 (P)),  (2)
where  (·)  denotes  the  standard  normal  distribution
unction  and
x
1 (c)  =
ln(x/c)  +  (r  +  (1/2)2)T

√
T
,
x
2 (c)  =
ln(x/c)  +  (r  −  (1/2)2)T

√
T
.
To  evaluate  the  risk-taking  incentive,  it  is  assumed  that
he  managers  of  the  ﬁrm  are  paid  with  manager  options  (MO)
ith  a  strike  price  K.  If  there  is  only  one  share,  the  manager
ption  can  be  evaluated  at  time  (t  =  0)  as:
O0 =  E0 ·  ˚(dE01 (K))  −  K  ·  e−rT ·  ˚(dE02 (K)).  (3)
As  a  possible  addition  to  the  remuneration,  managers  can
e  paid  with  inside  debt,  e.g.  with  CCB.  The  manager’s  CCB
MC)  can  be  valued  as  a  binary  option  for  which  pay-out  is
ependent  on  a  speciﬁc  threshold  (PMC):
C0 =  NMC ·  e−rT ·  ˚(dV02 (PMC))  (4)
Both  stock  options  and  manager’s  CCB  are  combined  in  an
emuneration  portfolio  (PF),  consisting  of    parts  manager
CB  and  1  −  ˛  parts  stock  options:
F0 =  ˛  ·  MC0 +  (1  −  ˛)  ·  MO0.  (5)
here  ˛  ∈  [0,  1].
Due  to  the  dependence  of  the  portfolio  on  equity,  the
mpact  of  the  CCB  in  the  capital  structure  can  be  shown
pon  the  remuneration.  As  a  drawback  of  this  modelling,  the
anagers  CCB  are  not  part  of  the  capital  structure,  i.e.  they
re  expected  to  have  no  inﬂuence  on  the  capital  structure.
To  measure  the  incentive  of  risk-taking  of  managers,
egas  are  calculated  (Vega  of  the  stock  option  and  of  the
anager  CCB)  as  the  following:
MO = ∂
∂
MO0 =  E ·  ˚(dE01 (K))  +  E0 ·  (dE01 (K))  ·
√
T  (6)
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MC = ∂
∂
MC0 =  −NMC ·  e−rT · (d
V0
2 (PM))  ·  dV01 (PM)

(7)
E = ∂
∂
E0
=  V0 ·  (dV01 (ND))  ·
√
T  +  NC ·  e−rT ·  (dV02 (P))  ·
d
V0
1 (P)

,  (8)
here  (·)  denotes  the  standard  normal  density  function.
Furthermore,  deltas  are  computed  as  well  to  measure  the
lignment  of  the  management  with  the  shareholders:
MO = ∂
∂V0
MO0 =  E ·  ˚(dE01 (K))  (9)
MC = ∂
∂V0
MC0 =  NMC ·  e−rT · (d
V0
2 (PM))
V0 ·    ·
√
T
(10)
E = ∂
∂V0
E0 =  ˚(dV01 (ND))  −  NC ·  e−rT ·
(dV02 (P))
V0 ·    ·
√
T
. (11)
. Results
he  following  scenario  is  created  to  measure  the  impact  of
CB  on  management12:  the  total  assets  are  set  to  V0 =  100,
he  par  value  of  the  normal  debt  is  ND =  85,  the  par  value
f  the  CCB  is  NC =  5,  the  threshold  or  trigger  value  is  set  to
 =  95  which  represents  a  5%  capital  ratio,  the  risk-free  rate
s  r  =  0.05,  the  ﬁrm’s  volatility  is    =  0.05,  and  the  time-to-
aturity  T  =  0.25.  The  remuneration  parameters  are:  strike
rice  of  the  stock  option  K  =  100  and  the  threshold  or  trigger
12 These are the same values Berg and Kaserer (2014) used in a
ormer version of their paper (August 2012) to analyse the risk-
aking incentive of CCB on shareholders.
a
m
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a
i
t
oe  stock  option.
alue  of  the  inside  CCB  is  PM =  95,  which  represents  a  capital
atio  of  5%.
.1.  Stock  options
n  the  left-hand  side  of  Fig.  2  one  can  see  Vega  of  the  stock
ption  (MO)  as  a  function  of  the  ﬁrm  value  with  a  ﬁxed  time-
o-maturity  (T  =  0.25).  The  black  dotted  line  indicates  the
ase  where  CCB  are  included  in  the  ﬁnancial  structure,  while
he  red  dashed  line  shows  the  Vega  when  no  CCB  are  issued.
In  each  case  the  highest  sensitivity-to-volatility  is  around
he  strike  price  of  the  stock  option  (K  =  100).  Only  the  level
f  the  peak  differs  between  both  lines.  On  the  right-hand
ide  of  Fig.  2  the  value  of  the  stock  option  is  shown  as  a
unction  of  risk,  by  name  the  volatility  of  the  ﬁrm’s  assets
).  The  slope  of  the  line  indicating  CCB  in  capital  structure
s  steeper  than  the  one  without  CCB.  Fig.  2  suggests  that  the
ssuance  of  CCB  in  the  capital  structure  of  a  ﬁrm  exaggerates
he  risk-taking  incentive  for  managers.  This  ﬁnding  supports
aal  (2012b), who  anticipate  manager  to  ‘‘shift  their  risk
reference  towards  even  higher  risk  proﬁles’’  when  CCB  are
ssued  by  the  ﬁrm.  Seeking  to  raise  their  own  wealth,  man-
ges  simply  increase  .  It  should  be  mentioned  that  this  is
ndependent  from  the  dilution  effect  of  the  CCB,  because
he  stock  option  relates  to  the  equity  as  a  whole.  The  higher
eak  of  the  Vega  with  CCB  can  be  explained  by  the  same
rgument.  The  independence  leads  to  more  equity  when
ore  risk  is  taken.
While  Fig.  2  only  shows  the  ﬁrm  value  corresponding
ega,  one  can  explore  the  time-varying  properties  of  man-
gers’  option  Vega  with  Fig.  3.  The  left  plot  of  Fig.  2
llustrates  a  cross-section  of  Fig.  3  at  T  = 0.25.  When  time-
o-maturity  rises,  the  sensitivity-to-volatility  of  the  stock
ptions  around  the  strike  price  increases  as  well.  Moreover,
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Figure  3  Vega  of  the  stock  option  as  a  function  of  ﬁrm  value  and  time-to-maturity,  with  CCB  as  part  of  the  ﬁnancial  structure  of
the ﬁrm.  Right-hand  side  plot  is  rotated  by  180◦.
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managers  with  stock  options  ‘‘at-the-money’’  and  to  reprice
them  if  the  ﬁrm  value  has  dropped  signiﬁcantly.13Figure  4  Delta
the  spread  around  the  strike  price  is  widening  in  time,  sug-
gesting  a  greater  bandwidth  of  risk-taking  incentive.
One  can  see  from  both  plots  of  Fig.  4  that  the  issuance  of
CCB  has  no  effect  on  the  Delta  of  the  stock  options.  The  left
plot  shows  Delta  as  a  function  of  the  ﬁrm  value  (V0),  while
the  right  plot  represents  the  value  of  the  stock  option  as  a
function  of  V0.
It  can  be  assumed  that  the  stock  option  has  a  positive
inﬂuence  on  the  incentive  to  increase  the  ﬁrm  value  only  if phe  stock  option.
0 is  already  higher  than  the  strike  price  of  the  stock  option.
his  observation  supports  the  policies  of  ﬁrms  to  pay  their13 The repricing seems to stand in completely contradiction to the
rinciples of shareholder value (Sautner, 2005).
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The  same  conclusion  can  be  drawn  by  taking  differentigure  6  Vega  of  manager’s  CCB  (inside  debt)  as  a  function  o
tructure of  the  ﬁrm.  Right-hand  side  plot  is  rotated  by  180◦.
.2.  Inside  debt
hile  the  last  subsection  observed  the  behaviour  of  man-
gers  who  are  paid  with  stock  options,  this  subsection
ocuses  on  the  results  when  inside  debt,  especially  CCB,
s  paid.  It  can  be  derived  from  Fig.  5  that  the  incentive
or  managers  to  increase  risk  is  only  relevant  in  times  of
nancial  distress.
The  Vega  hits  its  peak  near  the  trigger  point  (P  =  95).  The
esult  only  holds,  if  CCB  do  not  convert  instantly,  but  at  time-
o-maturity.  Till  then,  managers  could  increase  risk  to  pull
rm  value  above  the  trigger  point.14 Once  the  ﬁrm  value  is
14 If CCB do not convert instantly, managers have time to
anoeuvre until time-to-maturity. In reality, CCB either convert
t
d
i
i
p value  and  time-to-maturity,  with  CCB  as  part  of  the  ﬁnancial
igher  than  the  trigger,  the  manager  will  decrease  risk  near
he  trigger  point  to  avoid  the  downside.  The  right  plot  also
hows  that  more  risk  decreases  wealth  of  managers.  The  use
f  CCB  as  capital  instruments  in  the  ﬁnancial  structure  of
he  ﬁrm  is  not  relevant  to  the  risk-taking  incentive  of  man-
gers.  Therefore,  managers  who  are  only  paid  with  inside
ebt  would  try  to  decrease  risk  in  order  to  increase  their
ealth.  This  conﬁrms  former  research  of  inside  debt.ime-to-maturities  into  account  (see  Fig.  6).  The  risk-
ecreasing  feature  of  inside  debt  is  widening  over  time.  If
nstantly, leaving managers no choices, or the conversion-decision
s depended on the next ﬁnancial statement of the ﬁrm, with short
eriod of time for managers to react.
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change  the  incentive  to  increase  the  ﬁrm  value  at  all.
Because  these  results  are  derived  from  a  model,  some  of
the  assumptions  have  to  be  reﬂected  cautiously.  We  assume
that  managers  are  only  paid  with  either  stock  options,  inside
15 Sundaram and Yermack (2007) conclude ‘‘if the debt-to-equity
ratio of the manager’s holdings is less than the ﬁrm’s debt-to-
equity ratio, the manager has an incentive to increase risk, and
vice versa’’. The authors deﬁne the debt-to-equity ratio as the rela-
tion between debt- and equity-based parts of the compensationFigure  9  Delta  of  th
he  ﬁrm  is  not  in  ﬁnancial  distress  (i.e.  V0 > P  =  95)  inside  CCB
ave  little  to  no  effect,  because  managers’  CCB  only  change
heir  value  around  the  trigger  point  or  if  it  is  likely  that  the
rm  will  be  in  distress  at  time-to-maturity.
Left-hand  side  of  Fig.  7  plots  the  Delta,  which  only  have  a
alue  around  the  trigger  point.  Hence,  only  if  it  is  likely  that
he  ﬁrm  will  recuperate  from  ﬁnancial  distress,  Delta  is  pos-
tive  and  the  inside  debt  provides  an  incentive  to  increase
rm  value.  Furthermore,  it  is  apparent  from  the  right  plot
hat  the  value  of  the  manager’s  CCB  only  rises  in  this  area
nd  stays  on  the  same  level  if  the  ﬁrm  value  increases.  Both
bservations  indicate  that  managers  do  not  have  an  incen-
ive  to  increase  the  ﬁrm  value  at  all  once  the  ﬁrm  is  out  of
he  zone  of  ﬁnancial  distress.
As  a  result  of  the  given  observation,  the  sole  remuner-
tion  of  managers  with  inside  debt  not  only  decreases  the
ncentive  of  risk  taking,  but  also  decreases  the  incentive
o  increase  shareholder  value.  Hence,  managers  should  nei-
her  be  paid  solely  with  stock  options  nor  inside  debt.  A
ixture  of  both  in  a  compensation  portfolio  may  lead  to
 satisfying  result  and  will  be  discussed  in  the  following
ubsection.
.3.  Compensation  portfolio
s  deﬁned  in  Eq.  (5),  the  portfolio  consists  of  ˛  parts  of
nside  CCB  and  1  −  ˛  parts  of  stock  options.  This  can  be  seen
n  the  four  plots  of  Fig.  8.  The  top  plots  represent  the  Vega  of
he  compensation  portfolio  with  and  without  CCB  in  the  cap-
tal  structure  and  the  bottom  plots  illustrate  the  associated
ortfolio  values  dependent  on  .  One  can  see  that  ˛  =  0  and
 result  in  the  individual  plots  shown  in  Figs.  2  and  5,  respec-
ively.  The  comparison  of  the  graphs  under  consideration  of
CB  in  the  capital  structure  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  CCB
xaggerate  the  risk-taking  incentive  for  managers  around
he  strike  price  of  the  stock  options.  Nevertheless,  a  bigger
art  of  inside  debt  diminishes  this  effect  and  even  leads  to
 risk  aversion.  A  equally-weighted  portfolio  actually  clears
p
n
rmpensation  portfolio.
he  risk-taking  incentive,  as  considered  by  Sundaram  and
ermack  (2007).15
While  in  an  equally-weighted  portfolio  managers  have
o  incentive  to  increase  risk,  they  still  have  an  incentive
o  increase  the  ﬁrm  value.  In  the  absence  of  ﬁnancial  dis-
ress  the  Delta  of  the  portfolio  is  always  greater  than  zero  as
ong  as  there  is  at  least  some  remuneration  with  inside  debt
see  Fig.  9).16 Furthermore,  the  mixture  of  inside  debt  and
tock  options  forestall  the  repricing  of  ‘‘out  of  the  money’’
tock  options,  because  even  though  options  are  ‘‘out  of  the
oney’’  managers  still  have  an  incentive  to  increase  ﬁrm
alue  due  the  impact  of  inside  CCB.
. Conclusion
he  results  show  that  the  decision  of  issuing  CCB  to  ﬁnance
rm’s  assets  sets  incentives  to  managers  to  increase  risk,  if
he  compensation  is  not  adjusted  simultaneously.  However,
f  the  remuneration  of  managers  is  adjusted  at  the  same
ime  with  the  issuance,  e.g.  with  inside  debt,  the  draw-
acks  of  a compensation  solely  based  on  stock  options  can
e  equalised.  While  the  CCB  included  in  capital  structure
o  have  an  impact  on  the  risk-taking  behaviour,  they  do  notortfolio of a manager.
16 As shown above, the issuance of CCB in the capital structure has
o impact on the Delta of the compensations instruments. For that
eason, we do not distinguish between Delta with and without CCB.
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debt,  or  a  portfolio  containing  a  mixture  of  both.  We  do  not
consider  other  forms  of  performance-based  compensation.
A  possible  extension  of  the  model  could  involve  compensa-
tion  with  shares  or  even  salaries.17 Furthermore,  the  basic
assumptions  of  the  option  pricing  model  do  not  ﬁt  the  real-
ity,  where  neither  stock  returns  are  log-normally  distributed
nor  the  volatility  is  constant.  Whether  CCB  convert  in
the  model  is  decided  at  time-to-maturity  (European  option
characteristics)  or  not,  but  times  of  ﬁnancial  distress  and
time-of-maturity  of  the  CCB  are  not  necessarily  the  same.18
Although  we  observe  the  time-varying  inﬂuence  on  Vega,
further  research  of  sensitivity  of  the  incentives  regarding
time  is  needed.  As  mentioned  before,  the  remuneration  in
the  model  is  not  connected  to  the  capital  structure.  Fur-
ther  research  to  examine  the  backlash  of  the  remuneration
due  its  dilutive  effects  is  suggested.  Also,  it  is  uncertain  if
managers  are  able  to  inﬂuence  volatility  of  asset  returns.
More  likely,  managers  control  risk  by  investment  decisions
and  leverage,  which  are  only  two  of  many  determinants  of
ﬁrms’  assets  volatility.
Eventually,  CCB  decrease  the  asset-substitution  problem,
but  increase  managers’  risk-taking  incentives.  Therefore,
the  incentive  of  shareholders  to  give  incentives  has  changed
with  the  transformation  of  the  capital  structure  (Calcagno
and  Renneboog,  2007).  Hence,  stock  options  might  be  no
longer  shareholders’  ﬁrst  choice  for  managers’  remunera-
tion.
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